The U.S. auto mobile industry in an a shambles. Why?
Well, there are several contributing factors, such as higher labor costs, but there is one big reason. U.S. automakers don't make fuel-efficient vehicles that can compete.
Chronically, the automakers have planned on a short time horizon. They didn't invest over the long term, and they're unwilling to change the status quo. Ford, GM and Chrysler have too many inefficient trucks and SUV's, and their manufacturing processes take too long to retool. That's why cars like the Pontiac Grand Prix don't change body styles for 5 years or more, whle Toyota Camry gets a facelift every year or two.
Though the automakers developed hybrids, electric and fuel cell vehicles, they did so primarily as a PR move, with no intention of shipping green machines to the public unless they were absolutely forced to do so. Toyota forced their hand, and now American cars are playing a sad game of catch-up.
This myopic strategy has been ongoing for the last decade. Everyone knew the U.S. car industry was doing it.
What could have changed this? CAFE! Increasing average fleet fuel efficiency standards. The government could have forced the U.S. auto industry to build more fuel-efficent vehicles.
This would not only have made our carmakers greener, it would have made them more competitive over the long term.
Why didn't it happen? Because the Republicans insisted that it was better to let business play their game instead of having government get involved. Oh, and political contributions from the automakers might have had something to do with it, also.
It's really very simple. When you look at an industry, there are limitations in how the marketplace works. Most U.S. corporations don't have a long-term strategy. They're obsessed with short term profits and stock prices. Meanwhile, other governments write articles of legislation that force their industries to plan for the future. Consequently, their corporations are safer, greener, and more citizen friendly, and more competitive.
I'm all for free trade, but if we're going to take down trade barriers, why should the U.S. compete with one hand behind its back?
Friday, November 21, 2008
Tuesday, November 04, 2008
What government can do for biomedical research
Sharon Begley in Newsweek:
These barriers to "translational" research (studies that move basic discoveries from bench to bedside) have become so daunting that scientists have a phrase for the chasm between a basic scientific discovery and a new treatment. "It's called the valley of death," says Greg Simon, president of FasterCures, a center set up by the (Michael) Milken Institute in 2003 to achieve what its name says. The valley of death is why many promising discoveries—genes linked to cancer and Parkinson's disease; biochemical pathways that ravage neurons in Lou Gehrig's disease—never move forward.
The next administration and Congress have a chance to change that, radically revamping the nation's biomedical research system by creating what proponents Richard Boxer, a urologist at the University of Miami, and Lou Weisbach, a Chicago entrepreneur, call a "center for cures" at NIH. The center would house multidisciplinary teams of biologists, chemists, technicians and others who would take a discovery such as Keirstead's and nurture it along to the point where a company is willing to put up the hundreds of millions of dollars to test it in patients. The existence of such a center would free scientists to go back to making important discoveries, not figuring out large-scale pipetting, for goodness' sake.
Sunday, November 02, 2008
Skeptics Protest Bloggs Conviction
Fred Bloggs was convicted of the murder in court, yesterday. His fingerprints were found at the scene. The victim's blood and DNA were found on Bloggs's coat at his home. Also, the murder weapon was found in Bloggs's garage. Eyewitness accounts placed Bloggs at the murder scene on the day in question.
However, skeptics protested against the verdict. Protesters argued that Bloggs was a victim of as-yet-unexplained coincidences. They argued that the victim died of natural (although bizarrely bloody) causes.
Skeptics cited what they called missing evidence in the case. They argued that prosecutors failed to say precisely how Bloggs traveled to the murder scene. Though advocates for Bloggs could not produce an alibi for him, they claimed the court's judgment to be absurd if it could not say definitively whether Bloggs took the bus or rode his bike to the scene (or how many seconds late the bus was running).
Lacking evidence or alibis, protesters advanced even stranger arguments to defend Bloggs. The skeptics suggested that if a person could seem to be stabbed by an assailant in all physical respects without actually having been stabbed by an assailant, then there must be some ineffable difference between being physically stabbed by an assailant and actually being stabbed by an assailant. On this basis, they argued that it was unreasonable to convict Bloggs on the basis of physical evidence. The skeptics were elated by the cleverness of the argument, but when asked by a reporter whether the premise of the argument begged the question, the skeptics pretended they hadn't heard the reporter's question.
Overall, protesters said it had been a good day in the Bloggs case, and claimed that their demonstration was evidence that the case against Bloggs was in full retreat, and, indeed, that the practice of relying on physical evidence in court cases would soon be abandoned.
However, skeptics protested against the verdict. Protesters argued that Bloggs was a victim of as-yet-unexplained coincidences. They argued that the victim died of natural (although bizarrely bloody) causes.
Skeptics cited what they called missing evidence in the case. They argued that prosecutors failed to say precisely how Bloggs traveled to the murder scene. Though advocates for Bloggs could not produce an alibi for him, they claimed the court's judgment to be absurd if it could not say definitively whether Bloggs took the bus or rode his bike to the scene (or how many seconds late the bus was running).
Lacking evidence or alibis, protesters advanced even stranger arguments to defend Bloggs. The skeptics suggested that if a person could seem to be stabbed by an assailant in all physical respects without actually having been stabbed by an assailant, then there must be some ineffable difference between being physically stabbed by an assailant and actually being stabbed by an assailant. On this basis, they argued that it was unreasonable to convict Bloggs on the basis of physical evidence. The skeptics were elated by the cleverness of the argument, but when asked by a reporter whether the premise of the argument begged the question, the skeptics pretended they hadn't heard the reporter's question.
Overall, protesters said it had been a good day in the Bloggs case, and claimed that their demonstration was evidence that the case against Bloggs was in full retreat, and, indeed, that the practice of relying on physical evidence in court cases would soon be abandoned.
Thursday, July 10, 2008
Statistical weight versus gut, aka, more on zombies
Dualists do not a priori believe that consciousness has a physical component.
Imagine living 500 years ago. Peter says the mind is a physical mechanism, Dave says it's not all physical. Now what are Peter's predictions? Peter's predictions are that every cognitive function can be intercepted or corrupted by physical means. Meanwhile, Dave's predictions are that every cognitive functions may or may not be corrupted by physical means.
Centuries pass, and we find that, at every opportunity, Peter's predictions are validated. Dave's theory has not been absolutely ruled out, but it has been ruled out statistically. What are the odds that Dave's dualism is that one rare form of dualism that looks exactly like Peter's physicalism?
Well, the odds are overwhelmingly in favor of Peter. Every experiment that could go Dave's way but doesn't is a factor of two in favor of Peter's theory. Today, one would be guilty of gross fine-tuning (and gap argumentation) to suppose that Dave's theory were likely to be true. Even if Peter had passed only ten tests of physical cognitive function, Dave's theory would still be a million-to-one long shot.
The question is, does the zombie argument impose million(or billion)-to-one statistical argument that can cancel out all of Peter's data for the last five centuries?
No. The premise of the zombie argument is that human zombies are possible, i.e., that physicalism is insufficient to explain qualia. But qualia may not even exist as non-causal elements. Even if our belief favored the existence of non-causal qualia (and mine certainly doesn't), we would not be sure to one part in ten, let alone one part in a million. If we were billion-to-one certain that qualia existed as an non-causal part of the cognitive story, then Dave could happily sustain his debate with Peter. But that's just not the case.
Imagine living 500 years ago. Peter says the mind is a physical mechanism, Dave says it's not all physical. Now what are Peter's predictions? Peter's predictions are that every cognitive function can be intercepted or corrupted by physical means. Meanwhile, Dave's predictions are that every cognitive functions may or may not be corrupted by physical means.
Centuries pass, and we find that, at every opportunity, Peter's predictions are validated. Dave's theory has not been absolutely ruled out, but it has been ruled out statistically. What are the odds that Dave's dualism is that one rare form of dualism that looks exactly like Peter's physicalism?
Well, the odds are overwhelmingly in favor of Peter. Every experiment that could go Dave's way but doesn't is a factor of two in favor of Peter's theory. Today, one would be guilty of gross fine-tuning (and gap argumentation) to suppose that Dave's theory were likely to be true. Even if Peter had passed only ten tests of physical cognitive function, Dave's theory would still be a million-to-one long shot.
The question is, does the zombie argument impose million(or billion)-to-one statistical argument that can cancel out all of Peter's data for the last five centuries?
No. The premise of the zombie argument is that human zombies are possible, i.e., that physicalism is insufficient to explain qualia. But qualia may not even exist as non-causal elements. Even if our belief favored the existence of non-causal qualia (and mine certainly doesn't), we would not be sure to one part in ten, let alone one part in a million. If we were billion-to-one certain that qualia existed as an non-causal part of the cognitive story, then Dave could happily sustain his debate with Peter. But that's just not the case.
Friday, June 06, 2008
The Placeholder Fallacy
In physics, we have found a pattern of reduction and unification. James Clerk Maxwell discovered that the electric force and magnetic force are both aspects of a single electromagnetic force. Abdus Salaam, Steven Weinberg and Sheldon Glashow were awarded the Nobel prize for their work in revealing that the electromagnetic force and the weak nuclear force are two aspects of a single electroweak force. The hope is that, one day, we will unify all of the forces in a "Theory of Everything" (ToE) described by one or two simple equations.
However, as yet, we do not know whether the ToE exists. Some think that a String Theory might turn out to be the ToE, but for all we know, the ToE could be based on a radically different mathematics. For now, a ToE remains an elusive dream.
Imagine two astronomers are looking through a telescope tonight, witnessing a galaxy exploding mysteriously. One astronomer says to the other "Aha! This explosion is explained by the Theory of Everything!"
The other astronomer replies. "Really? What is the Theory of Everything?"
The first astronomer responds "I don't know what the Theory of Everything actually says, but, it being a theory of everything, it must explain this explosion."
Has the first astronomer explained the explosion?
Of course not! The first astronomer is merely using a reference to a theory he does not have. He is using a placeholder for an explanation as if he had the actual explanation.
This is akin to me stepping ashore on an unexplored continent, declaring the tallest mountain to be named "Mount Logic", and then trying to claim credit for the discovery of the tallest mountain on the continent.
Thus, I present you with what I call The Placeholder Fallacy
Note that if we knew what God was thinking, we could make some predictions, and then God would begin to be explanatory.
How does one expose instances of the placeholder fallacy? If the alleged explanation is prediction-less, just substitute the as-yet undiscovered Theory of Everything for the alleged explanatory agency. If it doesn't work for the ToE, it doesn't work for the agency either.
Example: "God explains the creation of the universe."
Test: "The ToE explains the creation of the universe."
Example: "God explains why this child survived the crash."
Test: "The ToE explains why this child survived the crash."
Example: "God explains why humans can think rationally."
Test: "The ToE explains why humans can think rationally."
However, as yet, we do not know whether the ToE exists. Some think that a String Theory might turn out to be the ToE, but for all we know, the ToE could be based on a radically different mathematics. For now, a ToE remains an elusive dream.
Imagine two astronomers are looking through a telescope tonight, witnessing a galaxy exploding mysteriously. One astronomer says to the other "Aha! This explosion is explained by the Theory of Everything!"
The other astronomer replies. "Really? What is the Theory of Everything?"
The first astronomer responds "I don't know what the Theory of Everything actually says, but, it being a theory of everything, it must explain this explosion."
Has the first astronomer explained the explosion?
Of course not! The first astronomer is merely using a reference to a theory he does not have. He is using a placeholder for an explanation as if he had the actual explanation.
This is akin to me stepping ashore on an unexplored continent, declaring the tallest mountain to be named "Mount Logic", and then trying to claim credit for the discovery of the tallest mountain on the continent.
Thus, I present you with what I call The Placeholder Fallacy
The Placeholder FallacyThis fallacy is most commonly used by theists when they claim that God can explain the existence of the universe, the fine-tuning of physical constants, or the origin of species. By the definition of a deity, God can certainly perform all of these tasks. This is no different from there being the possibility that an as-yet undiscovered physical law can explain all these things. What the theists really mean is that, if we knew the mind of God, we would have an explanation for these things, not just the possibility of an explanation. But theists generally reject the idea that we can know the mind of God well enough to predict anything like creation of universes, creation of life with common descent, etc. God, or rather the mind of God, is an explanation we do not (and can never) have. It can't explain anything until we know what God was thinking.
Treating a reference to an explanation you don't have as if it has explanatory power.
Note that if we knew what God was thinking, we could make some predictions, and then God would begin to be explanatory.
How does one expose instances of the placeholder fallacy? If the alleged explanation is prediction-less, just substitute the as-yet undiscovered Theory of Everything for the alleged explanatory agency. If it doesn't work for the ToE, it doesn't work for the agency either.
Example: "God explains the creation of the universe."
Test: "The ToE explains the creation of the universe."
Example: "God explains why this child survived the crash."
Test: "The ToE explains why this child survived the crash."
Example: "God explains why humans can think rationally."
Test: "The ToE explains why humans can think rationally."
Monday, May 05, 2008
Zombie Question-Begging
We get inferences to reduction even when we're not certain that our reductionist model accounts for every pre-reduction fact. For example, there are some complex systems of water that have not been simulated in terms of H2O molecules because the computational task is beyond our abilities. So it is possible that, say, some kinds of whirlpools cannot be accounted for in terms of H2O. Perhaps such whirlpools require some sort of irreducible water spirit? Yet, we don't doubt that water reduces to H2O. Why?
The argument is roughly like this: irreducible water spirits don't place constraints on experimental tests (while still being relevant to them), whereas physical reductionism does. Experimental results are consistent with the constraints when they needn't have been. Therefore, it is probable that water reduces to H2O.
Suppose there are fair coins and two-headed coins, and I take one of the coins at random and flip it in front of you. It lands heads. What are the odds that the coin is fair? Clearly, it is more likely that the coin is the two-headed coin. Now take this to the Nth power, and you'll see why we don't regard water as consisting of water spirits (fair coins), even if we have not formally reduced every instance of water behavior we have ever observed.
Similarly, there are a great many ways that minds are consistent with physics in ways they needn't have been if minds were not reducible to physics. Hence, it is rational to believe that minds are likely to be physical systems (they might be irreducible, but it is terrifically unlikely because we would be supposing that very special, fine-tuned form of irreducibility that looks just like reducibility wherever we look).
As for the zombie argument, I personally think there's some very subtle question-begging going on. In order for qualia to escape the aforementioned reductionist inference, it has to be claimed that qualia are wholly irrelevant and disconnected with physics. By making this claim, it is also implicitly claimed that qualia cannot have a physical explanation. If this assumption is sustained, then qualia don't have any implementation, so physical minds don't place any more constraints on experiment than do irreducible ones, and the inference to reduction to physical minds fails.
However, if we deny from the start that qualia can have a physical explanation, that's begging the question. There are also multiple arguments to the effect that physically irrelevant qualia don't exist at all.
(Originally a comment on Philosophy Etc.)
The argument is roughly like this: irreducible water spirits don't place constraints on experimental tests (while still being relevant to them), whereas physical reductionism does. Experimental results are consistent with the constraints when they needn't have been. Therefore, it is probable that water reduces to H2O.
Suppose there are fair coins and two-headed coins, and I take one of the coins at random and flip it in front of you. It lands heads. What are the odds that the coin is fair? Clearly, it is more likely that the coin is the two-headed coin. Now take this to the Nth power, and you'll see why we don't regard water as consisting of water spirits (fair coins), even if we have not formally reduced every instance of water behavior we have ever observed.
Similarly, there are a great many ways that minds are consistent with physics in ways they needn't have been if minds were not reducible to physics. Hence, it is rational to believe that minds are likely to be physical systems (they might be irreducible, but it is terrifically unlikely because we would be supposing that very special, fine-tuned form of irreducibility that looks just like reducibility wherever we look).
As for the zombie argument, I personally think there's some very subtle question-begging going on. In order for qualia to escape the aforementioned reductionist inference, it has to be claimed that qualia are wholly irrelevant and disconnected with physics. By making this claim, it is also implicitly claimed that qualia cannot have a physical explanation. If this assumption is sustained, then qualia don't have any implementation, so physical minds don't place any more constraints on experiment than do irreducible ones, and the inference to reduction to physical minds fails.
However, if we deny from the start that qualia can have a physical explanation, that's begging the question. There are also multiple arguments to the effect that physically irrelevant qualia don't exist at all.
(Originally a comment on Philosophy Etc.)
Wednesday, April 02, 2008
Abstractions and Language
Suppose I see a rabbit for the first time. I know it is small, brown, has four legs, is furry and has big ears. In recognizing the bunny, I have created a filter in my brain - a rabbit recognizer. Anything that is recognized by this filter I will call a "rabbit". This filter is an abstraction because it will recognize any rabbit, including rabbits I have yet to see.
So when I say "rabbits have long ears" I really mean that "my rabbit filter is triggered by (among other things) long ears."
This exposes an important fact about language. It means that when we speak in terms of abstractions, we don't have to be referring to some Platonic ideal or some floating universal. We can be referring to our own faculties, and what would trigger those faculties to recognition.
So when I recognize what a watch is doing when it is keeping time, I automatically create an abstraction filter for time-keeping. I can speak of time-keeping mechanisms in the abstract because I refer to the filter in my mind that recognizes such things. And I can say that the time-keeping ability of this particular watch is due to the mechanical mechanism inside of it.
So when you ask "Is a watch a time-keeper in the absence of minds?" you have to decide what you mean by the question. "Time-keeper" could mean that I presently see and recognize and use the device as a time-keeper. Or "time-keeper" could mean that, if I had such a device here and now, I would recognize it as a time-keeper. You would have to take time-keeper only in the strict, former sense of the word to say that time-keepers would not exist without us. However, taking the word "time-keeper" in this sense is misleading. If I used the first definition, then any watch not in my presence would not be a time-keeper. (And any rabbit yet to be born would not be a rabbit, etc.) No one takes language to mean this. The language is taken such that a device is a time-keeper if it would be recognized as such by a mind, if a mind were present.
So when I say "rabbits have long ears" I really mean that "my rabbit filter is triggered by (among other things) long ears."
This exposes an important fact about language. It means that when we speak in terms of abstractions, we don't have to be referring to some Platonic ideal or some floating universal. We can be referring to our own faculties, and what would trigger those faculties to recognition.
So when I recognize what a watch is doing when it is keeping time, I automatically create an abstraction filter for time-keeping. I can speak of time-keeping mechanisms in the abstract because I refer to the filter in my mind that recognizes such things. And I can say that the time-keeping ability of this particular watch is due to the mechanical mechanism inside of it.
So when you ask "Is a watch a time-keeper in the absence of minds?" you have to decide what you mean by the question. "Time-keeper" could mean that I presently see and recognize and use the device as a time-keeper. Or "time-keeper" could mean that, if I had such a device here and now, I would recognize it as a time-keeper. You would have to take time-keeper only in the strict, former sense of the word to say that time-keepers would not exist without us. However, taking the word "time-keeper" in this sense is misleading. If I used the first definition, then any watch not in my presence would not be a time-keeper. (And any rabbit yet to be born would not be a rabbit, etc.) No one takes language to mean this. The language is taken such that a device is a time-keeper if it would be recognized as such by a mind, if a mind were present.
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